Skip to content

Applying ‘al-Qaeda’ Methods of Assassination by Drone to Russian Military Officers. Is Ukraine Still the Proxy?

Somewhat lost in the recent media/Pentagon brouhaha, over the United States providing Ukraine with co-ordinates of Russian targets, is the question of applying the “al-Qaeda” drone-assassination technique to Russian military officers. And does having a Ukrainian proxy push the button on the drone keep the U.S. from moving from a passive belligerent to an active belligerent?

Back in mid-March, the United States began delivering to Ukraine Switchblade 300 attack drones, described as “loitering munitions.” Instead of drones that deliver a missile and return to their operating base, the Switchblade 300 is more of a flying camera attached to explosives. Only 5.5 lbs, it is deployed to a designated area, where it can maneuver for up to 15 minutes (tagged as “hovering”), and then, upon signal from its operator, be hurled toward a target, destroying itself upon impact. It is also known as a “kamikaze” drone. Of some importance, it is light enough for a single operative in the field—not someone in front of a terminal in Nevada—to push the button. And it is not powerful enough to destroy much more than human beings, certainly not “hard” targets.

The Times's description didn’t hide much, it wrote on May 4: “The Biden administration is also supplying new weaponry that should improve Ukraine’s ability to target senior Russian officers. The smaller version of the Switchblade drone, which is now arriving on the battlefield, can be used to identify and kill individual soldiers, and could take out a general sitting in a vehicle or giving orders on a front line. American officials have acknowledged publicly that the United States began giving Ukraine actionable intelligence in the run-up to Russia’s invasion on Feb. 24.” (https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/04/us/politics/russia-generals-killed-ukraine.html)

On May 4, the New York Times published the story of the successful killing of Russian officers, based upon intelligence provided by the U.S. The next day, on May 5, the Pentagon spokesman John Kirby dutifully responded that the U.S. only provides intelligence so that Ukraine can defend itself. What Kyiv decides to do with the target acquisition intelligence is their business. What is said, and not said, by both the Times and the Pentagon, gives the game away.

First, some of the Times language:

• “Adrienne Watson, a National Security Council spokeswoman, said in a statement that the battlefield intelligence was not provided to the Ukrainians ‘with the intent to kill Russian generals.’” Then what is the Switchblade 300 for? It is a pretty expensive replacement for a rifle.

• The intelligence allows the Ukrainians “to conduct artillery strikes and other attacks that have killed Russian officers.” Assumedly, those deliberately unspecific “other attacks” were not martial arts or karate.

• “Officials interviewed for this article spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss details of the classified intelligence being shared with Ukraine. The administration has sought to keep much of the battlefield intelligence secret, out of fear it will be seen as an escalation and provoke President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia into a wider war.” Evidently, were certain practices acknowledged openly, it was thought it could lead to a wider war. (Yet, apparently, that caution no longer seems to apply for the Times sources.)

Now, some language from Kirby’s clarification:

• “The United States provides battlefield intelligence to help Ukraine defend their country. We do not provide intelligence on the location of senior military leaders on the battlefield or participate in targeting decisions of the Ukrainian military.” One would certainly infer from this that locations of most military officers are provided on a regular basis. Further, locations of the mobile command centers can be provided, without specifying a “senior” military leader.

• “Ukraine combines information that we and other partners provide with the intelligence that they themselves are gathering, and then they make their own decisions and they take their own actions.” So, if a senior military leader were “droned,” that would assumedly be from the non-U.S. portion of the intelligence gathering.

Finally, on Saturday, April 30, Gen. Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces visited the key city of Izium, newly occupied by the Russian military. Ukraine assaulted the location, and various Ukrainian sources reported that Gerasimov had been wounded or killed. The Times disclaimer: “Not all the strikes have been carried out with American intelligence. A strike over the weekend at a location in eastern Ukraine where Gen. Valery Gerasimov, Russia’s highest-ranking uniformed officer, had visited was not aided by American intelligence, according to multiple U.S. officials. The United States prohibits itself from providing intelligence about the most senior Russian leaders, officials said.”

Minimally, one learns that the U.S. doesn’t prohibit itself from targetting officers below “the most senior Russian leaders.” But, further, the Times's May 4 performance suggests that some around the Pentagon and/or the intelligence community want Gerasimov, along with President Putin and Minister of Defense Shoigu, to blame the Ukrainians for the April 30 incident. Regardless, taken as a whole, Russia is to know that the U.S. is equipping their proxy with the same drone-assassination operation from the supposed anti-terror effort.