For most of March, Shanghai, China—a city of 26 million—had about three dozen new cases of COVID-19 per day. It shot up to around 300/day in the first week of April, and reached 3,000/day by April 19. That peak was unheard of in China, but it is the equivalent of less than 40,000/day for the U.S. (roughly about 40% of the U.S.’s present level). Since then, new cases have dropped to around 250/day within the next three weeks, and in the last several days, to about two dozen (less than in March). COVID-19 deaths have dropped to zero for the last several days.
During the two-month-long war (and lockdown), Shanghai’s total cases rose to 63,000, most of them since April, with less than 1% fatalities (595 total deaths). That is, 1 death per 43,700 residents—compared to the U.S. level of 1 death per 330 residents. At the U.S. level, Shanghai would have lost 78,000 more souls. Does some clever bean-counter want to now explain how China is spending too much effort and resources on its “zero-COVID” policy?
On June 1, China’s State Council issued guidelines for a package of assistance to help the economy recover: more than 400 billion yuan of new tax rebates to be refunded will be in place in July; a credit line of 800 billion yuan for infrastructure; and temporary subsidies or assistance to migrant workers, whether they presently have insurance or not. In addition inspection teams have been sent out to the 12 provinces to investigate how the policies are being implemented.
