British analyst Anatol Lieven, the director of the Eurasia program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, in a commentary published in Foreign Policy on Aug. 27, reports that he recently had the opportunity to speak, “on the basis of confidentiality, to a wide range of members of the Russian establishment, including former diplomats, members of think tanks, academics, and businesspeople, as well as a few members of the wider public. Their ideas about the war, and the shape of its eventual ending, deserve to be better understood in the West and in Ukraine itself.”
“Most of my conversations took place before the Ukrainian invasion of the Russian province of Kursk. As far as I can make out, however, this Ukrainian success has not changed basic Russian calculations and views—not least because, at the same time, the Russian army has continued to make significant progress farther east, in the Donbass, where the Russians are closing in on the key town of Pokrovsk,” Lieven reports. “‘The attack on Kursk may help Ukraine eventually to get rather better terms, but nothing like a real victory,’ in the words of one Russian security expert. ‘They will sooner or later have to withdraw from Kursk, but we will never withdraw from Crimea and the Donbass.’”
Lieven says his contacts, none of whom are named, believe that Russia should not, and probably could not, attempt to capture major cities like Kharkov—they point to the months-long battle for Bakhmut—but, historically, cities have always proven to be very difficult military targets. “Any areas of the countryside in Kharkiv province that can be taken should therefore be regarded not as prizes but as bargaining counters in future negotiations. Underlying this attitude is the belief that to create a Russian army large enough to attempt such a complete victory would require a massive new round of conscription and mobilization….”
