The NASA Inspector General (IG) issued a report on the “Block 1B” program on Aug. 8, the upgraded Apollo-era “command module” slated to carry the increased cargo and crew loads to the Moon as part of the Artemis II mission, now slated for launch in September 2028. While the title of the report, “NASA’s Management of Space Launch System Block 1B Development” mentions no specific contractor, to say that it is largely focused on the Boeing Company (mentioned over 100 times in the report’s 32 pages) would be an understatement. The problems revealed by the IG’s report are so pervasive within the larger U.S. economy as a whole, it implicitly raises the larger question: Can the U.S.—currently dominated by the post-industrial, shareholder/profit-driven culture so pervasive in the Western world—actually “return” a human crew to the Moon?
The IG’s report focuses on the Exploratory Upper Stage (EUS), a module consisting of four rockets and two fuel tanks—of which Boeing is the primary contractor. Boeing doesn’t even make the RL-10 engines; they will be supplied by Aerojet Rocketdyne, leaving Boeing responsible for making two fuel tanks, one for hydrogen and one for oxygen—a task which ought to be well within range of America’s largest aerospace corporation. Under Boeing’s profit-driven management however, the EUS program is both over budget and behind schedule, with the IG estimating that the cost—originally expected to be $962 million, will have tripled to $2.8 billion by the time of completion in 2028. “Boeing’s delivery of the EUS to NASA has also been delayed from February 2021 to April 2027,” the report adds, “and when combined with other factors, suggests the September 2028 Artemis IV launch date could be delayed as well.”
One of the failures that the IG cited is being “improper” (meaning defective) is the welding, which must be done to extremely exacting standards on space-faring vehicles. The welding and other quality-control issues at contractor Michoud “are largely due to the lack of a sufficient number of trained and experienced aerospace workers at Boeing,” the IG said. While Boeing provides “training and work orders” supposedly to mitigate for this inadequacy, the IG found that they were “largely inadequate.” In fact, the report reveals that Boeing is counting on the “cost-savings” of this cheap labor to make up for its (shareholder-pleasing) cost overruns, an argument they have made directly to NASA officials.
In light of the disaster, the IG has recommended a four-point plan to NASA, three of which have already been implemented. The “sticking” point—and the one that NASA is afraid to breach—is that of “Institut[ing] financial penalties for Boeing’s noncompliance with quality control standards.”
