By: Lt. Col. Ralph Bosshard (ret.)
This article was originally published on Global Bridge. It has been translated into English and published with the permission of the author. It does not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of EIR.
December 14, 2024—After the use of the previously little-known "Oreshnik" missile against an industrial target in Dnipro 1 , some Western media rushed to declare that hypersonic weapons were useless and the threat of using them was a bluff. 2 And Ukraine claimed to be able to intercept these weapons. But will the realization at some point prevail that there is not much to be gained from such claims? News from the USA does not allow this conclusion for the time being.
In his public appearances, President Putin has only provided very summary information about the "Oreshnik" missile, but an assessment of the plausibility of his statements and those of Ukraine is possible. 3 The interception of ballistic missiles is subject to very strict physics-based limits.
Blame Game
With the Oreshnik, Russia has not invented a groundbreaking new missile, but has instead developed old models further. This makes sense when one takes into account the costs of developing new complex weapons systems, and ones know how much time can pass before new models work as desired. The know-how for building medium-range ballistic missiles was still available in Russia from Soviet times, and the use of system components from other missiles increases efficiency not only in the construction but also in the daily operation of virtually any weapon system. 4 Whether Russia began developing the Oreshnik missile before the INF treaty was terminated is therefore an academic question with a large gray area.
The new global balance of power certainly played a role in the USA's termination of the INF treaty, because as long as the INF treaty was in force, the USA was not allowed to build medium-range missiles, whereas China, which had been newly identified as an opponent, was allowed to do so. 5 In order to avoid taking the blame, the Americans simply had to steer the discussion in such a way that the Russia could be held responsible for the end of this important arms control regime. The Western press was happy to join in.
Test Site Ukraine
Like any other ballistic missile, the Oreshnik can theoretically be shot down. 6 This is possible in the ascent phase, i.e. in the one to two minutes that a missile needs to rise to the 100 or 120 km altitude, at which the end of the Earth's atmosphere is generally located. 7 It should be noted that even the most modern target acquisition and fire control systems as well as the weapons themselves require a certain reaction time before an interception process can begin. At high altitudes, however, modern ballistic missiles reach speeds of up to 5,500 m/s, which exceed the capabilities of missile defense systems. 8 The missiles of the Patriot system only reach their maximum speed of Mach 4, i.e. around 1,200 m/s, at a certain altitude. 9 How soon they reach this speed, and exactly what the reaction time of the entire system is, is certainly classified information. On the other hand, by using older missiles, the Russian armed forces have now learned about these technical parameters. In English, this process is called "probing".
[see footnote] 10
As a result, there is only a short window of time available for intercepting an ascending rocket, possibly just one minute, which in turn means that missile defense systems must be brought within a few dozen kilometers of the launch pad of the rocket to be intercepted. Sketch maps showing rocket intercepts on the border of Belarus, that were published by certain newspapers in the recent past, are therefore incorrect.
War in Space?
In theory, it is easier to intercept the warheads of ballistic missiles in exo-atmospheric flight, where air friction hardly plays a role. On the other hand, it is easiest for a missile to fly evasive maneuvers here. It is well known that, in addition to the USA, Russia, China, India and Israel can also intercept missiles in near-Earth space. 11 But intercepting objects in space is a line that none of the conflicting parties has yet crossed. This is where the USA's support for Ukraine ends.
After a warhead re-enters the Earth's atmosphere, there is also only a short window of time for an intercept. Hypersonic speeds are nothing new here either. 12 Meanwhile, decoys, individually controllable multiple warheads 13 and those with the ability to fly evasive maneuvers even in the hypersonic range make the interception of incoming warheads even more difficult. 14 The space that missile defense systems can protect is therefore very limited and the important systems in turn require protection from attacks from the air. In this specific case, this means that the Ukrainian army can only really protect a few selected objects.
Kiev's Big Talk
These are considerations based on the laws of physics and on the limits of today's technology. Even the Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian unicameral parliament, ed.) cannot override the laws of physics, neither in Ukraine nor anywhere else.
Whether the precision of the Patriot system itself and the performance of its fire control systems allow it to hit an object flying at a speed of 1,500 to 3,000 m/s, perhaps 60 cm in diameter and 150 cm in length, is a completely different question that will not be discussed here, because the technical data that would be necessary for an assessment are certainly classified. In practice, this means that a Patriot fire unit can only protect an area of a few square kilometers from a medium-range ballistic missile. For short-range missiles with a range of 150 km, this area may be larger, but for a medium-range missile whose warhead arrives at an angle of 80 degrees, i.e. almost vertically, it can be a maximum of a few kilometers. 15
For all these reasons, Ukrainian claims to have successfully shot down a ballistic missile warhead should currently be met with the greatest skepticism. This is probably propaganda.
Security Umbrella for Russia's allies?
The question also arises as to what kind of targets Zelensky—or rather the West—wants to hit in Russia. By shelling the rear facilities of the force groups deployed in Ukraine, he will only be able to temporarily slow the advance of the Russian troops. This is perhaps what the Biden administration is concerned about: It is about preventing Biden from being associated with a second defeat after Afghanistan in 2021. If he can delay the defeat until the end of January, he will be happy. More is probably not possible at the moment.
If President Zelensky gets involved in a war with medium-range ballistic missiles, he will lose it and his Western allies will not be able to help him either. He must recognize that the warmongers who want to supply him with more and more powerful weapons are giving him bad advice. However, level-headed minds must understand that the political damage may outweigh the military benefit of supplying more missiles. The escalation ladder has to end somewhere.
With a proven arsenal of non-nuclear strategic weapons and weapon systems to defend against the enemy's strategic weapons, Russia can now provide other countries with a security umbrella without having to fear being drawn into a nuclear war. Belarus appears to be the first to benefit from this offer. This is probably the purpose of stationing Oreshnik missiles in Belarus, because all targets that can be reached from Belarus are also within reach of those in Kaliningrad or in the Donbass. At the moment, Biden is threatening, in the case of Syria, to bomb a state that cannot defend itself. Other states will recognize the time pressure and may not rely on Trump to be more reasonable.
Blockheads from Washington
Development of complex systems such as new medium-range missiles is not the result of a whim of heads of state or government—in the specific case of the Oreshnik not of President Putin—but rather, the expression of many years of conceptual work. The foundations for this were laid in the 1980s, when the Soviet Chief of General Staff Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov increasingly began to doubt the importance of nuclear deterrence because he had come to the realization that a political victory in a nuclear war was impossible, and also judged limited nuclear options to be practically impossible. Therefore, President Putin's statements about nuclear wars are nothing new from Moscow. This represents a contrast to the strategy of nuclear deterrence, which essentially involves self-defense through suicide and is once again celebrating its resurrection. Just recently, the director of the US government's strategic planning department, Rear Admiral Thomas Buchanan, expressed the view that the USA must use nuclear weapons to maintain its global supremacy; he is clearly 45 years behind in his thinking. 16 And Buchanan can clearly live with the idea of a nuclear war—provided it takes place in Europe.
Russia's Oreshnik is not a short-lived firework—there may be more to it than is currently believed in the West. But if the West believes that the damage caused in Dnipro is not enough of a warning, then they can also see whether Putin can find a more powerful warhead in his arsenal. 17
Ogarkov also did not believe that a war between nuclear powers could remain conventional. That is why he began to emphasize the need for non-nuclear strategic deterrence. In his publications, Ogarkov repeatedly contrasted the stability of conventional conflicts with the innate instability of nuclear warfare. That is why he argued that one should rely on high-precision non-nuclear weapons and modern operational management systems. His later successor as Chief of the General Staff, Sergey F. Akhromeyev, held similar views and was one of the architects of the INF Treaty. In future wars, Ogarkov was convinced, the winner would be the one with high-precision non-nuclear systems. Their use would help to minimize human losses, but at the same time successfully eliminate the military infrastructure of the likely enemy and force it to surrender. The course of the war in Ukraine so far suggests that Ogarkov's forty-year-old views are being implemented. Another of Ogarkov's demands was that a modern army must be able to create the conditions for ending the conflict before it moves to the extensive use of nuclear weapons. The next few weeks will show whether this will succeed. 18
Formerly Dnepropetrovsk. A video of it: “Rusia y Ucrania: video de la llegada del misil balístico a Dnipró” on RCN Radio on YouTube, November 21, 2024, online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4gQyPa_eag.. ↩
Typical examples are Chris York and Martin Fornusek: “Don’t overreact’ — Oreshnik missile isn’t as new as Russia claims, experts say”, on Kyivindependent.com, November 22, 2024, online at https://kyivindependent.com/what-is-russias-oreshnik-missile-and-what-happens-next/. Apparently, Western editorial offices have still not drawn the conclusions from the already notorious underestimation of their opponent. On the other hand, the initial assessments by pro-Russian media may have been somewhat exaggerated. See Pepe Escobar: “Trump may be Oreshniked on Ukraine even before he gets to China”, at strategic-culture.su, November 27, 2024, online at https://strategic-culture.su/news/2024/11/27/trump-may-be-oreshniked-on-ukraine-even-before-he-gets-china. Compare M.K. Bhadrakumar: “A defining moment in the Ukraine war”, at Indian Punchline, November 24, 2024, online at https://www.indianpunchline.com/a-defining-moment-in-the-ukraine-war/, and Rainer Rupp: The message of the "hazelnut" to Ukraine and NATO, at Seniora, November 26, 2024, online at https://seniora.org/politik-wirtschaft/1-die-botschaft-der-haselnuss-an-die-ukraine-und-nato.. ↩
See Announcement of the President of the Russian Federation, Заявление Президента Российской Федерации, November 21, 2024, online at http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75614. Compare meeting with the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, representatives of the defense industry and the builders of missile systems, Совещание с руководством Минобороны, представителями ВПК и разработчиками ракетных систем, November 22, 2024, online at http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/75623, both on the homepage of the President of the Russian Federation, in Russian. Literally translated, Oreshnik stands for hazel bush.. ↩
The development of the Oreshnik is likely to have taken place in connection with the RS-26 Rubesh intercontinental ballistic missile, which in turn is based on the RS-24 Yars. See "Орешник" on Military Russia, December 1, 2024, online at http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-977.html. See also “Angriff in Dnipro: Wie neu war Putins Rakete wirklich?” in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung FAZ.net, November 22, 2024, online at https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ukraine/angriff-in-dnipro-wie-neu-war-putins-rakete-wirklich-110128050.html and Oliver Imhof: “ Ukraine-Krieg: Russlands neue Rakete Oreschnik im Test – Was steckt dahinter?” in: Der Spiegel, November 22, 2024 online at https://www.spiegel.de/ausland/ukraine-krieg-russlands-neue-rakete-oreschnik-im-test-was-steckt-dahinter-a-1b8cadaf-b8a6-4012-9554-9ad74b61ed6d. See also Joseph Trevichnik: “Russia's Experimental Ballistic Missile Used To Strike Ukraine Is Based On The RS-26 Rubezh”, at The Warzone, November 21, 2024, online at https://www.twz.com/land/russias-experimental-ballistic-missile-used-to-strike-ukraine-is-based-on-the-rs-26-rubezh. See also Svetlana Shcherbak: “What Missile Hides Under the Name Kedr, and Could It Be Both Oreshnik and Rubezh?” At Defense Express, November 24, 2024, online at https://en.defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/what_missile_hides_under_the_name_kedr_and_could_it_be_both_oreshnik_and_rubezh-12631.html. The standardization of designs and system components had long been discussed in Russia, including in the General Staff course that the author attended in 2013/14.. ↩
English: Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, Russian: Договор о ликвидации ракет средней и меньшей дальности (РСМД). In German also "Washingtoner Vertrag über nukleare Mittelstreckensysteme". Information and text of the treaty in English on the US State Department's website, online https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm#text. See "INF Treaty of December 8, 1987", online at http://www.peterhall.de/treaties/inf/inf1.html,. ↩
An assessment of today's missile defense capabilities can be found in Daniel Lübbert, Christian Behme, Felix Faltin: “Raketenabwehr – technische Aspekte und naturwissenschaftlicher Hintergrund”, Scientific Services of the German Bundestag, Berlin 2007, available online at http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/archive/2012/1220/dokumente/analysen/2007/Raketenabwehr.pdf.. ↩
The Kármán line at an altitude of around 100 km is generally considered to be the boundary to space, although the Earth's atmosphere theoretically extends to around 600 km. The Hungarian-American aeronautical engineer Theodore von Kármán defined this altitude as the altitude at which centrifugal forces become more important for flight than aerodynamic forces. The US armed forces consider 80 km altitude to be the altitude at which aerodynamic flight ends. This also roughly corresponds to the boundary of the mesopause. The air pressure at this altitude is roughly one thousandth of that at sea level. See also " Aufbau der Atmosphäre " at Bildungsserver.de, online at https://wiki.bildungsserver.de/klimawandel/index.php/Aufbau_der_Atmosph%C3%A4re. Gases from the earth extend to the moon, however; compare Nadja Podbregar: “Erdatmosphäre reicht bis zum Mond”, at bbscinexx.de, February 22, 2019, online at https://www.scinexx.de/news/geowissen/erdatmosphaere-reicht-bis-zum-mond/.. ↩
The burnout speed of the RSD-10 Pioner (Russian РСД-10 Пионер, known in the West as SS-20), which is probably one of the predecessor models of the Oreshnik, was between 3000 and 5500 m/s, i.e. in the hypersonic range. The RSD-10 was a two-stage solid-fuel rocket. Overview including stationing locations at Peterhall.de: “RSD-10 (SS-20)”, online at http://www.peterhall.de/rvsn/missiles/rsd-10/pioner11.html; cf. “RT-21M / SS-20 SABER” at Globalsecurity, online at https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/rt-21m.htm. Short film by Vladimir Nikulin in Russian on YouTube, “RSD 10 Pioneer SS 20 Saber Ракетный комплекс Темп-С” online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oehsHD9T8cw.. ↩
The speed of sound depends on the air density and temperature. At -25 degrees it is around 300 m/s. Such temperatures are to be expected permanently in the upper troposphere and the stratosphere.. ↩
See Wolfgang Greber: “Neue russische Rakete: Kleines Lexikon der Hyperschalltechnik”, November 22, 2024 online at Die Presse, https://www.diepresse.com/6066943/neue-russische-rakete-kleines-lexikon-der-hyperschalltechnik and Daniel Lübbert, Christian Behme, Felix Faltin: Missile defense, ibid. Radar satellites and satellite-based launch detectors are missing from Greber's graphic.. ↩
The Standard Missile 3 (SM-3), designed as an interceptor missile against intercontinental missiles, was also used successfully against satellites, for example on February 21, 2008 against an out-of-control spy satellite that was destroyed at an altitude of 247 km. China and India have already shot down satellites with ground-based missiles in the recent past. See Mike Mount: “Officials: U.S. to try to shoot down errant satellite”, at CNN, February 14, 2008, online at https://edition.cnn.com/2008/TECH/space/02/14/spy.satellite/index.html and Thomas Wehr: “USA 193 – letztes Trümmerstück verglüht”, at raumfahrer.net, October 21, 2008, online at http://www.raumfahrer.net/raumfahrt/raketen/usa193.shtml. For India, see Rajat Pandit: “India shoots into star wars club”, in Times of India. March 28, 2019, online at https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-shoots-into-star-wars-club/articleshow/68605713.cms. On China, see Andrew Jones: “China's Shijian-21 towed dead satellite to a high graveyard orbit”, at spacenews.com, January 27, 2022, online at https://spacenews.com/chinas-shijian-21-spacecraft-docked-with-and-towed-a-dead-satellite/ and http://www.raumfahrer.net/raumfahrt/raketen/usa193.shtml, and Guido Meyer: “ China «entführt» einen eigenen Satelliten aus dem geostationären Orbit”, at Neue Zürcher Zeitung NZZ, March 22, 2022, online at https://www.nzz.ch/wissenschaft/weltraum-china-entfuehrt-einen-satelliten-aus-dem-orbit-ld.1675120. For Russia, see " Russland hat laut Pentagon wohl Anti-Satelliten-Waffe ins All geschickt," at Der Spiegel. May 22, 2024, online at https://www.spiegel.de/ausland/russland-hat-laut-pentagon-wohl-anti-satelliten-waffe-ins-all-geschickt-a-a3c95daa-efc7-4d12-8783-12a75cc29fad and Rainer Kurlemann: “Ist Objekt 2014-28E ein Killersatellit?” at Rheinische Post, November 25, 2014, online at https://rp-online.de/panorama/wissen/ist-objekt-2014-28e-ein-killersatellit_aid-16301433, and Christoph Seidler: “Gefahr für ISS, russischer Waffentest lässt Trümmerwolke durchs All jagen”, in Der Spiegel. 16.11.2021, online at https://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/kosmos-1408-russland-schiesst-satelliten-ab-truemmer-gefaehrden-iss-a-d8f3b231-b451-48a2-8e34-a43f108ba8a4.. ↩
See Blake Stilwell: “Why Russia's Hypersonic Missiles Can't Be Seen on Radar”, at Military.com, online at https://www.military.com/equipment/weapons/why-russias-hypersonic-missiles-cant-be-seen-radar.html. For general information on hypersonic weapons, see "Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress," updated February 13, 2023, Congressional Research Service, online at https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R45811.pdf, p. 16f; Marsden, Harriet: “New Russian missile makes Western defenses obsolete”, at. The Independent, June 3, 2017, online at https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-hypersonic-zircon-missile-system-testing-successful-putin-sputnik-defence-obsolete-a7770641.html. See also Wolfgang Greber: New Russian missile: a.a.O.. ↩
English: MIRV Multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles. See “Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV)”, at Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, online at https://armscontrolcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/MIRV-Factsheet.pdf and “MIRV” at atomwaffen A-Z, online at https://www.atomwaffena-z.info/glossar/begriff/mirv.. ↩
English MARV: Manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle. See “Manoeuvrable Reentry Vehicle (MARV)” at Atomwaffen A-Z, online at https://www.atomwaffena-z.info/glossar/begriff/marv.. ↩
In contrast to conventional artillery shells, which achieve their greatest range with an elevation of around 50 degrees, ballistic missiles achieve their greatest range when fired at higher angles because this allows them to leave the dense air layers earlier. These can be angles of up to 70 degrees.. ↩
See Gretchen Small: “Getting the American People `Nuclear War Ready’”, at Executive Intelligence Review, December 9, 2024, online at https://eir.news/2024/12/news/getting-the-american-people-nuclear-war-ready/. The transcript of his speech under "Project Atom 2024 - CSIS PONI keynote" from November 20, 2024 on the homepage of the US Strategic Command, online at https://www.stratcom.mil/Media/Speeches/Article/3976019/project-atom-2024-csis-poni-keynote/ and a video with his interview at https://www.csis.org/events/report-launch-project-atom-2024.. ↩
In addition to nuclear warheads, Russia's ballistic missiles and cruise missiles can also carry aerosol warheads. See John Pike, Charles Vick, Mirko Jacubowski, Patrick Garrett: Iskander/SS-26, at Federation of American Scientists. 22.01.2024, online at https://nuke.fas.org/guide/russia/theater/ss-26.htm and Albrecht Rothacher: Russia's military today, at Austrian Military Journal ÖMZ, 5/September-October 2008, online at https://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/omz/oemz2008_05.pdf, p. 578.. ↩
See Michael Kofman: “The Ogarkov Reforms: The Soviet Inheritance Behind Russia's Military Transformation”, at Russia Military Analysis, a Blog on the Russian Military, 11.07.2019, online at https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/2019/07/11/the-ogarkov-reforms-the-soviet-inheritance-behind-russias-military-transformation/ and "Ogarkov Doctrine in the Past and Present“, at Top War, December 20, 2019, online at https://en.topwar.ru/165683-doktrina-ogarkova-v-proshlom-i-nastojaschem.html, as well as “Nikolai Vasilyevich Ogarkov”, at Global Security, online at https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/ogarkov.htm and Mary C. FitzGerald: Marshal Ogarkov on the Modern Theater Operation, on the homepage of the US Naval War College, online at https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol39/iss4/3/. See also Timothy L. Thomas: Russian Forecasts of Future War, in Military Review, May-June 2019, online at https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MJ-19/Thomas-Russian-Forecast.pdf and Peter A. Mattsson: “Russian Military Thinking--A New Generation of Warfare”, in Journal on Baltic Security, Vol 1, Issue 1, 2015, online at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/313252767_Russian_Military_Thinking_-_A_New_Generation_of_Warfare. See “Доктрина Огаркова»: как глава Генштаба СССР научил воевать американцев”, at Рамблер, September 11, 2020, online at https://weekend.rambler.ru/read/44820055-doktrina-ogarkova-kak-glava-genshtaba-sssr-nauchil-voevat- Amerikantsev/ and Андрей Сидорчик: Человек, который мог разгромить НАТО. Победная доктрина маршала Огаркова, bei Аргументы и Факты, at Аргументы и Факты, January 23, 2019, online at https://aif.ru/society/history/chelovek_kotoryy_mog_razgromit_nato_pobednaya_doktrina_marshala_ogarkova, both in Russian.. ↩