A discussion is clearly underway in Russia on what terms peace should be made with Ukraine, after Russia has won the war. A window into that discussion is provided by an article written by Dmitri Trenin, an Academic Supervisor of the Institute of World Military Economy and Strategy at the Higher School of Economics University in Moscow, first published in Profile.ru, then translated and published in RT on Dec. 20. Readers of EIR will recall Trenin’s discussion of the global issues at stake in the conflict in Ukraine when he spoke during Panel 1 of the Schiller Institute’s Dec. 7–8 conference.
“As the conflict in Ukraine nears its inevitable conclusion—a Russian victory—our thoughts must turn towards the future and to the shape of the peace that follows,” Trenin wrote in this new article. The Russian government’s oft-stated policy is that any negotiated peace must minimally include: a) Ukraine cannot join NATO; and b) the country must be de-nazified of the Banderite fascists currently in control of the country.
His basic premise is that “victory means defeating the West’s campaign to weaken Russia. It means ending the Banderite regime and securing our nation’s future. For Ukrainians, Russia’s victory will mark their liberation from a corrupt, foreign-imposed regime. For Russians, it will ensure stability, security, and strength for generations to come. Victory Day must be a day of liberation—for all of us.”
Among Trenin’s central points is the issue of “The Future Map of Ukraine.” The 1991 borders are gone, he writes; Crimea, Donbass, and two other regions have “returned to Russia through referendums.” Other regions “will likely follow,” he argues, naming Odessa, Nikolayev, Kharkov, and Dnepropetrovsk as potential candidates for rejoining Russia. “But not all of them,” he specifies. “We will take only what can be integrated and defended. Expansion must be strategic, not emotional.”
After completing its mission of liberating all of Ukraine “from the neo-Nazi Bandera regime and its foreign sponsors,” the critical question then becomes what kind of Ukraine will emerge in the parts which have not rejoined Russia in the course of the war. Trenin lists four post-war scenarios which Russian experts envision as possible, but the scenario which Trenin considers “the most realistic and advantageous” is that of a “divided Ukraine.” He suggests that one part of Ukraine, that bordering on Russia, would be “smaller but stable, economically integrated with Russia, and politically neutral.” With aid from Russia and other neighbors, this state could be “first pacified, then peaceful, eventually a partner, and ultimately an ally.”
As for the rest of Ukraine: the “anti-Russian forces could be pushed into the western regions under NATO protection, possibly splitting the country into a ‘Free Ukraine’ controlled by Poland, Hungary, and Romania, and a new Ukraine. Let the West console itself with this Cold War-style buffer state.”
