Some U.S. circles appear to have come to the conclusion that the United States cannot deliver a decisive strategic defeat against China, and so another policy is needed. That is the subject of the paper released on Oct. 14 by the RAND Corporation policy shop, titled “Stabilizing the U.S.-China Rivalry.” Its lead author is Michael J. Mazarr, who has been at RAND as Senior Political Scientist since 2014, after a career which ranged from serving as Associate Dean at the U.S. National War College to being the CEO and president of the Henry L. Stimson Center, a year-plus as Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other posts in between. He is, in other words, no newcomer to U.S. policymaking.
The stated premise of the report is that “the geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China embodies risks of outright military conflict, economic warfare, and political subversion, as well as the danger that tensions between the world’s two leading powers will destroy the potential for achieving a global consensus on such issues as climate and artificial intelligence. Moderating this rivalry therefore emerges as a critical goal, both for the United States and China and for the wider world.”
To that end—developing “some degree of modus vivendi” with China in various domains that would extend over at least three to five years—the paper recommends the U.S. should clarify its objectives “with language that explicitly rejects absolute versions of victory and accepts the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party.” That will stir up anti-China war-hawks such as Mike Gallagher and Matthew Pottinger, who long have argued that there is “No Substitute for Victory” against China, in the headline of their April 10, 2024 Foreign Affairs article.
The document proffers several broad principles to be agreed on for stabilizing the “rivalry,” recommends six “broad-based initiatives,” and suggests more specific strategies for three areas of relations deemed more difficult: Taiwan, the South China Sea, and competition in sciences and technology. Such recommendations as “reestablishing several trusted lines of communication between senior officials” are unquestionably useful.
The strategy proposed by the authors, however, is crippled by its axiomatic premise that no fundamental common interest exists between these two great nations, so that “preserving limited areas for coordination” and “managing rivalry” to reduce the risk of crises, is the best that can be hoped for. “Our goal in developing an agenda of stabilization was limited. We do not believe that collaborative coexistence is possible today,” the paper’s Summary asserts.
Humanity deserves better than such geopolitical trash!
