Two individuals connected to Ukraine have been detained by Russia, accused of the attempted assassination of Gen. Vladimir Alekseyev, the first deputy chief of Russia’s Military Intelligence (GRU)—and also close to the head of Russia’s negotiating team in Abu Dhabi, GRU head Adm. Igor Kostyukov. The alleged shooter, Lubomir Korba, detained in the UAE and extradited to Russia, had arrived in Russia in December at the direction of Ukraine’s special services (SBU), according to Russia’s Investigative Committee. He is thought to be from Ukraine’s Ternopil region.
Viktor Vasin, a long-time acquaintance of Korba, has also been detained, now charged under two articles of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. It is thought that his debt situation may be a factor in his participation. A third person, Zinaida Serebritskaya, has been named as an accomplice and has, according to Russia’s FSB, fled to Ukraine. Her role is unclear, though she is reported to have lived in the same apartment building as Alekseyev. As such, it might explain how the gunman planned to obtain access to the building and/or how intelligence was obtained as to Alekseyev’s habits and schedule.
While the Investigative Committee named Ukraine’s SBU as directing the gunman, more remains to be known. Certainly, the SBU has been involved in such assassinations, and Yevhenii Khmara, its new acting head, has experience running SBU special operations and, more recently, heading the SBU’s Center Special Operations Alpha operation. But Alekseyev had also been targeted by the EU, the U.S. Treasury Department, Azov Commander Denys Prokopenko [see separate slug] and, reportedly, Ukraine’s Military Intelligence Directorate (HUR).
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov had called the shooting a “terrorist act,” adding that it “once again confirmed the focus of the [Vladimir] Zelensky regime on constant provocations aimed... at disrupting the negotiation process.” Whether or not Alekseyev’s working relationship with Kostyukov, the head of Russia’s negotiating team, is found to have a direct role with the negotiations, the attempted assassination cannot but be evaluated in terms of a direct message from no less than a hardcore faction in Kiev—SBU wetworks team and/or others.
A further element, not to be put aside, is that it was Kostyukov who, on January 1, handed over the physical evidence on another of Kiev’s wild wetworks operation, its targeting of President Putin’s residence.
