South China Morning Post columnist Zhou Bo, in a Sept. 18 op-ed explained his understanding of what China’s concept of “minimum deterrence” actually means. Zhou reports that, for China, “minimum deterrence” means maintaining a nuclear posture sufficient to ensure it can carry out a retaliatory strike in response to a first strike against China. This does not in any way conflict with or contradict Chinese stated no-first-strike policy.
“In my understanding, ‘minimum level’ refers to a threshold that no other nuclear power would dare to cross with a pre-emptive nuclear strike on China, even if China maintains a policy of “no first use” of nuclear weapons,” Zhou writes. “Precisely because of this policy, China has to build adequate strength for deterrence. It requires China to have sufficient nuclear warheads to resist an enemy’s first strike and ensure China has second-strike capability.
“With such nuclear capabilities, China’s military could have a better chance of emerging victorious over the U.S. in the event of a conventional war, such as one in the Taiwan Strait. Given that the gap between the conventional military forces of China and the U.S. is already closing, China having a large enough nuclear arsenal would force the U.S. to give up any ideas of using nuclear weapons first.
“China’s call for a ‘no first use’ policy might look to some people like wishful thinking at a time when nuclear weapons seem to be growing in importance amid the ongoing wars in Ukraine and Gaza, but it isn’t. Nuclear weapons are not an omnipotent force, and having them is no guarantee of success in a conflict. If China, the U.S., Russia, Britain and France can all agree that a nuclear war cannot be won and therefore should never be fought, then why can’t they commit to their own ‘no first use’ policy?”
