A. Wess Mitchell, a State Department official in 2018-2019, seems to be trying to make the case that Henry Kissinger’s method of diplomacy should be the guiding light for Donald Trump. Mitchell, along with Elbridge Colby, is the co-founder of The Marathon Initiative which describes its mission as being “To preserve America’s prosperity, security, and democratic way of life in an era when they are threatened by the return of great power competition.” Colby is now the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, the third highest position in the Pentagon, while Mitchell has positioned himself as a major influence on Trump Administration policy from the outside. Among others associated with The Marathon Initiative as policy advisors are Edward Luttwak, identified by EIR as far back as 1979 as a British subject and Israeli intelligence agent then working out of Georgetown University; retired Admiral Dennis Blair, former commander of Pacific Command; former German Defense Minister Thomas de Maizière; and Walter Slocombe, a former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy who also served as a senior official in the U.S. occupation authority in Iraq in 2003-2004.
In an article published in Foreign Affairs on April 22, Mitchell calls for the return of “great power diplomacy.” In the present circumstances, he warns that “Great-power war, absent for decades, is again a real possibility.” Therefore, “the United States will need to rediscover diplomacy in its classical form—not as a bag carrier for an all-powerful military or as a purveyor of global norms, but as a hard-nosed instrument of strategy.” The essence of diplomacy in strategy, he claims, “is to rearrange power in space and time so that countries avoid tests of strength beyond their ability.”
This is pure, British-style geopolitics that Mitchell is arguing for. His diplomacy consists of seeking alliances to contain rival powers and “cultivating favorable balances of power in critical regions.” Among others, he cites Kissinger’s hero Prince Metternich as having “used the balance of power to extend his empire’s position as a great power well beyond its natural lifespan.”
Along the way, Mitchell rejects any notion of diplomacy based on a higher shared humanity. “These leaders (Otto von Bismarck being his other example) never tried to forge partnerships based on anything other than shared interests,” he writes. “They did not believe they could transform hostile countries into friendly ones through logic and reason. They certainly never believed that diplomacy could overcome irreconcilable visions of how the world should be. Their goal was to limit rivals’ options, not seek to remove the sources of conflict.”
As for China and Russia, Mitchell proposes that Trump approach these two “rival” powers—rivals of the U.S., that is—as Nixon and Kissinger did in the 1970s. “Today, the weaker rival is Russia,” he claims. “This has become all too obvious as Ukraine has chewed through Moscow’s military resources (never mind that Russia has chewed through Ukraine and NATO’s military resources—ed.). The United States should thus aim to use Russia’s depleted state to its advantage, seeking a détente with Moscow that disadvantages Beijing. The goal should be not to remove the sources of conflict with Russia but to place constraints on its ability to harm U.S. interests.”
