Gen. Alexus Grynkevich, the commander of NATO and of U.S. European Command, expounded on the alliance’s “theory of Victory”, which is supposed to stop a Russian assault on NATO’s eastern flank in its tracks at the border. “The theory posits the conduct of a denial defence, an approach tightly aligned with the Alliance’s strategy, what we call Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic area, or DDA,” he explained, according to the text of the speech published by NATO. Grynkevich’s theory seems to be based on the notion that Russia plans to attack the alliance in a World War II-style frontal assault on NATO’s eastern flank while also ruling out other ways a NATO-Russia war might start.
“We will see if an attack is coming, giving us time to assess intent and rapidly position our forces,” Grynkevich confidently asserted. “In doing so we aim to deter, but these movements also prepare us to deny any potential attack, including those aimed at seizing and holding NATO territory as a fait accompli. In short, they prepare us to execute our most sacred task, the defense of our people, and our territory.”
“We will block the initial attack. If the attack persists, we will blunt it and prevent enemy advance. And if required, we will break the enemy’s forces and the operational warfighting system that is arrayed against us.
“To block, our land forces will move to and dominate any enemy assault at the point of contact. Through maneuver, we will fix the enemy formations and deny the seizure of Alliance territory. Land-based forces will attack the enemy and destroy his advancing forces, but they won’t be doing this alone.
“Our air forces and navies, working in concert with our space and cyber forces, will rapidly gain freedom of maneuver. With air and maritime superiority rapidly secured in and over the battlespace, these forces will bring mass and precision to bear, denying the enemy the ability to hold their ground.
“Following this initial block, we will blunt any ongoing or follow-on offensive actions against us. Using advanced sensors, autonomous systems, and multi-domain forces, we will deny the attacker the ability to generate momentum or gain the initiative. Synchronised employment of multi-domain effects down to the tactical level will overwhelm enemy formations in contact, and their advance, if it’s continuing at all at this point, will falter further.”
Later on, Grynkevich explained that “we are not seeking to impose a strategic defeat on our adversary, nor do we need to do so. Rather, we are only seeking to stop any attack in its tracks, to deny the ability to seize and hold our territory.”
