In an article posted in Compact online publication on Sept. 13, and reprinted on the respected American Committee for U.S.-Russia Accord (ACURA) website, Christopher Caldwell undertakes an analysis of the dire consequences of any decision to “permit” Ukraine to use U.S. weapons to strike deep into Russian territory. Going straight to the heart of the matter, he quotes Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Sept. 12 response to a media question: “If this decision is made, it will mean nothing less than the direct participation of NATO countries, the United States, the European countries, in the war in Ukraine. This changes the very nature of the conflict.”
Putin is right, Caldwell insists, because it is the nature of the ATACMS weapon that it requires sophisticated GPS targeting impossible for Ukraine to deploy. “The weapon uses a dedicated system that the United States controls, drawing on a constellation of satellites run by the U.S. military that operate together in real time.… An ATACMS strike isn’t just moral or material support for a friend, who may be in the right or may be in the wrong. It is a deadly, unambiguously American-authored act of war. In suggesting that this would be a rash escalation, Putin is putting things mildly. “
While previous weaponry used by Ukraine has been guided by NATO technology, it has been possible for both Russia and the U.S. to ignore that reality if they chose, and maintain the fiction that Ukraine is the actor. A move to the use of ATACMS makes it impossible to maintain the fiction.
Turning to the political features of the insanity, Caldwell makes a passing reference to Donald Trump’s warning of the war danger in the Presidential debate, noting that Trump may have been hyperbolic but he was also right. The problem, Caldwell argues, is that “intellectuals from one end of the Washington foreign-policy establishment to the other are feeling lucky. They have convinced themselves that Putin is `bluffing.’ Maybe they are right. But a nuclear exchange isn’t the only bad outcome that could result from such a reckless military adventure.”
Finally, Caldwell observes, this is all happening at a dangerous time. While the requirement that the commander-in-chief must ask for a declaration of war from Congress has not been honored for decades, the President has at least had to explain his war decisions in some way. But, Caldwell states, “Right now, the President is insufficiently compos mentis to do that. He has been deemed mentally incapable (by his own Justice Department’s special counsel) of standing trial in a mishandling-of-documents case and physically incapable (by his own party) of managing a presidential campaign—a challenge considerably less arduous than a military campaign. With the elected commander-in-chief absent from the scene, awkward questions arise. Who is his regent? Who in this administration is escalating the Russia-Ukraine war by drawing the United States closer to active participation in it?”
All good questions.
