Senior German Social Democrat Rolf Mützenich, whose proposal on Monday, May 4, to have talks on missile disarmament with Russia has angered the war party, has elaborated on his view in an article published by IPG journal on May 7. The journal is a publication of the SPD-linked Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Mützenich’s article represents an important kernel of sanity emanating from Germany, which is currently gripped by a pro-war hysteria.
Under the headline, “Europe’s Strategic Gap,” Mützenich writes: “It remains questionable whether intermediate-range missiles would actually have increased Europe’s security. The risks associated with their deployment should not be entirely ignored. … The danger of an unintended military escalation would therefore have been considerable, especially since they are solely under the control of decision-makers in the U.S.A.
“Likewise, the deployment lacked a link to a serious arms control offer from the outset, as was the case with NATO’s dual-track decision. For example, Russia could have been offered the option of foregoing the deployment of intermediate-range missiles if, in return, Russia withdrew its Iskander-M missile systems from Belarus and Kaliningrad.”
European rearmament must go together with diplomacy, Mützenich continued that “that also includes active disarmament and arms control. Especially when Trump and Putin are negotiating behind the scenes about the stability of their strategic nuclear arsenals and great-power relations, Europe cannot be left out. Nuclear weapons in Europe directly affect our security, and therefore we can and must address these issues. Narrowing the debate in Germany and Europe solely to rearmament is increasingly restricting our strategic room for maneuver—both on the issue of arms control and in the negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.”
Beyond intensified cooperation with other Western powers, “Europe should also focus more intently on the Global South. Many states there also have no interest in a world of spheres of influence and military great power politics. It is precisely here that important points of contact for new forms of cooperation emerge – including in the areas of multilateral arms control and non-proliferation.” This is urgent, he goes on, because “All of this shows that the danger of nuclear war is greater today than ever before,” and unlike previous arms control agreements, today it is not just a matter of the two powers U.S. and Russia, but also there are new nuclear actors, technological modernization, and the blurring of lines between conventional and nuclear deterrent systems. “Particularly among the major powers, there is a growing trend toward thinking that fosters the illusion that nuclear wars are once again feasible and winnable. Furthermore, the debate, both in our own country and others, regarding the control and co-determination of, for example, British and French nuclear weapons, has not enhanced our credibility in international dialogue.” Also, China has to be included in binding arms control agreements. The new nuclear arms race swallows up billions of dollars, Mützenich writes, “these funds are then lacking elsewhere—for instance, in the fight against climate change, in economic recovery, and in the pursuit of social justice. …
“Europe must resolutely confront the danger of a new nuclear arms race. Likewise, nuclear weapons tests— regardless of who conducts them— must be clearly and unequivocally condemned. In the past, Europeans have repeatedly succeeded in providing crucial impetus for reducing tensions and for multilateral arms control and non-proliferation through a judicious combination of defense capabilities and diplomacy. Such a policy is urgently needed again today – probably more than ever,” Mützenich concludes.
